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Abstract. We study three different models in which public goods axe supplied by private contribu- 
tions. In one of these models, tax-financed government subsidies to private contributions will 
definitely increase the equilibrium supply of public goods. In the other two models, government 
subsidies are neutralized by offsetting changes in private contributions. We explain why it is that 
these models lead to opposite conclusions and we argue on the basis of our first model that a 
government that wants to use taxes and subsidies to increase total provision of public goods will 
be able to do so. Indeed, our model yields a surprisingly decisive comparative statics result. If pub- 
lic goods and private goods are both normal goods, then an increase in the subsidy rate will neces- 
sarily increase the equilibrium supply of public goods. 
1. Introduction 
Peter  W a r r  (1983) discovered the remarkable  fact that  in  a Nash equi l ibr ium 
model  of  vo lun ta ry  publ ic  goods supply,  small income redis t r ibut ions  among  
cont r ibu tors  to a publ ic  good are neutral ized by changes in  equi l ibr ium private 
dona t ions .  Pr ivate  consumpt ion  by individuals  and  the supply of  publ ic  goods 
remain  exactly the same as before redis t r ibut ion.  War r  (1982) also observed 
that  small  government  con t r ibu t ions  to a publ ic  good,  paid for by arbi t rary  
lump sum taxes on cont r ibutors ,  would  be offset dol lar- for-dol lar  by reduc- 
t ions in private cont r ibut ions .  The compara t ive  statics of  non- inf in i tes imal  
redis t r ibut ions  and  of economies where some cont r ibutors  may  make  zero con- 
t r ibut ions  were examined by Bergstrom, Blume, and  Var ian  (1986). They 
showed that  redis t r ibut ion  is not ,  in general,  neut ra l  if the a m o u n t  of  income 
dis t r ibuted away f rom any  consumer  exceeds his vo lun ta ry  con t r ibu t ion  to the 
publ ic  good.  
* This work was begun while the authors were both attending the Warwick Summer Research 
Workshop in Economics in July 1991. The authors are grateful to Clive Fraser of the University 
of Warwick for helpful comments. Andreoni also thanks the National Science Foundation and the 
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for financial support. 
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Russell Roberts (1987, 1992) suggested that if public goods are paid for by 
distortionary taxes, then efficiency would be improved by a mixed system in 
which the public good is supplied by private contributions that are (perhaps 
very heavily) subsidized by the government. While this idea seems appealing, 
it must somehow be reconciled with apparently contradictory results of  Bern- 
heim (1986), and of Andreoni (1988), each of  whom extended Warr 's  result to 
show that seemingly distortionary taxes and subsidies may be neutralized by 
changes in private donations. 
This paper examines the neutrality results found by Andreoni and by Bern- 
heim, and presents a new model in which increases in subsidy rates will neces- 
sarily increase the equilibrium supply of  public goods. We show that in all of  
these models neutralization of  tax-subsidy schemes is limited to "smal l"  
changes in tax obligations that do not exceed anyone's  voluntary contributions 
in the original equilibrium. Moreover, we argue that it is possible for govern- 
ments to design "dis tor t ionary"  tax-subsidy policies which can predictably in- 
crease the equilibrium total amount  of  contributions to a public good. 
2. G a m e  1 - A m o d e l  where  government  subsidies  are not  neutral 
Here and in subsequent sections we follow the useful precedent set by Bernheim 
(1986) and Nett and Peters (1990) of  describing the economy as a multi-stage 
game, with distinct stages in which government sets policy parameters, con- 
sumers choose actions, and the government collects taxes and provides public 
goods. 
The economy has n consumers, one private good and one pure public good. 
Preferences of  consumer i are represented by a utility function, Ui(g,ci) , where 
g is the amount  of  public good provided and c i is i's private consumption. 
Consumer i has an initial endowment of  m i units of  private good. The public 
good is produced from private goods at a cost of  one unit of  private good per 
unit of  public good. The public good is supplied by voluntary private contribu- 
tions, which may be subsidized by the government. Let gi be the amount  of 
public good donated by consumer i. Total supply of  public goods is then g = 
]~ gi. Let g - i  = g - gi denote contributions by consumers other than i. The 
government subsidizes voluntary contributions at the rate I~, where 0 < 13 < 
1. Thus, if consumer i contributes gi units of  public good, he will receive a 
payment of  [~gi from the government. The cost of  the government subsidies is 
paid with a system of  taxes such that consumer i is taxed for a fixed share s i 
of  total government outlays, where s i _> 0 for all i and E~ s i = 1. The govern- 
ment 's total expenditure on subsidies is [~g, and consumer i's tax bill is si[~g. 
The budget constraint of  consumer i is 
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C i + (1-13)g i = m i - s i n g .  (1) 
with the additional constraint that gi 2 0. 
The game has three stages. In stage 1, the government chooses the subsidy 
rate [3, and tax shares s l , . . .  ,s n. In stage 2, consumers simultaneously choose 
their contributions gi so as to maximize their utilities subject to the budget 
constraints in Equation 1. In stage 3, the government observes the vector 
gl . . . . .  gn and collects taxes sing from each i and pays a subsidy, [~gi, to each i. 1 
We study Nash equilibrium for consumers in stage 2. In equilibrium, each 
consumer's choice of  gi is his best response, given the total contributions g - i  
of  others. Each i chooses gi tO maximize Ui(g_i + gi,ci) subject to Equation 1 
and subject to gi ~ 0. Notice that if consumer i believes that his choice of  gi 
does not change the contributions of  others, then he must believe that his 
choice of  gi will determine the variable g and will also determine his tax bill 
siDg and his subsidy payment Dgi. Equation 1 can be rearranged as follows: 
C i + (1--13(1--Si))g = m i + (1--13)g_ i. (2) 
In equilibrium, each consumer i's choice of  gi is equivalent to choosing g to 
maximize Ui(g,ci) subject to Equation 2 and subject to the constraint that g _> 
g-i" 
Let us define the demand functions, Gi(p,y ) and Ci(p,y), so that Gi(p,y) and 
Ci(p,y ) are the choices of  g and c i that maximize Ui(g,ci) subject to the budget 
constraint c i + pg -- y. Following the standard definition of normal goods in 
consumer theory, we say that private and public goods are both normal goods 
for consumer i if Gi(p,y) and Ci(p,y) are both strictly increasing functions of  
y.2 
When public and private goods are both normal goods, we have a remarka- 
bly strong and decisive result. Not only does a unique equilibrium exist for any 
given subsidy rate, but the amount of public good supplied is an unambiguous- 
ly increasing function of  the subsidy rate. 
Theorem 1. (Existence and Uniqueness.) If preferences are continuous and 
strictly convex and if public goods and private goods are normal goods, then 
for any [3 such that 0 _< 13 < 1 and for any s 1 . . . . .  Sn, such that 0 _ s i < 1 for 
all i and such that E~s i = 1, there exists exactly one Nash equilibrium 
gl," • "'gn" 
The proof  of  Theorem 1 is provided in the Appendix. While other authors have 
shown existence and uniqueness with similar models, our proof  is new and, we 
think, of  some interest. 
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Theorem 2. (Monotonicity in Subsidies.) If the assumptions of Theorems 1 
hold and if in addition, all consumers i have " s m o o t h "  indifference curves, 
then the larger is the subsidy rate 13, the greater will be the amount  of public 
goods supplied. 
Readers who just want to see how the story comes out may choose to skip to 
the next section, while those with strong interests in public goods provision may 
find it useful to follow the proof  of Theorem 2. Many writers have avoided 
dealing with comparative statics with corner solutions on grounds of tractabili- 
ty. This proof,  we hope, will show that sharp and elegant comparative statics 
results can be found without the assumption that equilibrium is interior. 
In order to prove Theorem 2, we establish a lemma that is a rather interesting 
general proposition in consumer theory. Stated informally this result is as fol- 
lows: If there are two goods and both are normal, then if the price of  one good 
falls and income changes in any way whatsoever, it must be that either (a) de- 
mand increases for the good whose price falls or (b) demand decreases for the 
good whose price stays constant (or possibly both). 3 
Lemma 1. Let all consumers i have strictly convex preferences and " sm o o th "  
indifference curves a t  (g,ci). 4 If  both goods are normal goods and p '  < p, 
then for any y and y ' ,  either G i (p ' , y ' )  > Gi(p,y ) or Ci (p ' ,y ' )  < Ci(p,y). 
Proof  of Lemma 1 
Let p '  < p, and let g '  = Gi(p ' ,y ' ) ,  g = Gi(p,y), c '  = Ci (p ' ,y ' ) ,  and c = 
Ci(p,y ). By the principal of revealed preference it must be that Gi( p ' ,p '  g + ci) 
> Gi(p,y ) and Ci( p ' ,p '  g + ci) < Ci(p,y ). There are two possibilities. Either Pi~ 
+ c i ~ y ' ,  or Pig + ci > Y'. In the former case, it follows from normality 
of  g that Gi (p ' ,y '  ) _> Gi(p',pi'g + ci) > Gi(p,y ). In the latter case it follows 
from normality of  c i that Ci( p ' ,y '  ) < Ci( p ' ,Pig + el) < Ci(P,Y)" QED 
Proof  of  Theorem 2 
Consider the Nash equilibria that correspond to two different subsidy rates, 13 
and 13', where 13' > [~. For each i, define Pi = 1 - 13(1-si) and Pi' --- 1 - 
13'(1-si). Then Pi' < Pi" Let Yi = mi + (1-l])g_i  and let Yi' = mi + 
(1-13')g'  -i- Let S be the set of  consumers for whom gi > 0. 
Suppose that g'  __ g. If for some consumer i E S, Gi(P' ,Yi') > Gi(P,Y), then 
g'  >- Gi (p ' , y ' )  > Gi(p,y ) = g. Therefore if g'  _< g, it must be that for all i 
E S, Gi(p',yi') ~ Gi(P,Y)" It follows from Lemma 1, that if g'  _< g, then 
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Ci (p ' ,y i '  ) < Ci(p,y ) for  all i E S. Let  c i' = Ci(p ' ,y i '  ) and c i = Ci(p,y). Accord-  
ing to the budget  equat ion  (1), for  all i E S, c i = m i - (1-[~)g i - sing and  c i' 
= m i - (1-13 ' )g  i' - sil3g'. I f  c i' < c i for  all i E S, it mus t  be tha t  EsC i' = 
E s ( m i - ( 1 - 1 3 ' ) g i ' - s i ~ g ' )  < ]~sCi = ~2s(mi-(l-13)gi-si[3g ) and hence ( I - p )  Ysgi 
+ ~sSi[~g < ( l - l ) ' ) ] ~ s g i '  + ~2sSi[~'g'. But ZiESg i = g and EiEsgi '_ < g ' -  There-  
fore  (1 - 13 + ]~sSi)g < (1 - 13' + EsSi)g'. Since 0 < (1 - [3' + Y-sSi) < (1 - D + ZsSi), 
it mus t  be  tha t  g '  > g. But this contradicts  our  initial a s sumpt ion  that  g '  < 
g. It  fol lows that  g '  > g. Q E D  
3. G a m e  2 - A game  with  neutral subsidies  
In  this section we consider  an al ternat ive model ,  due to Andreon i  (1988), in 
which taxes and  small  government  subsidies to public goods  are neutral ized in 
equi l ibr ium. Al though,  as we will see, the applicabi l i ty  o f  neutral i ty  is l imited 
to relatively small changes in tax rates,  it is interesting to see just  how it happens  
tha t  fiscal policies tha t  seem capable  o f  altering the a l locat ion o f  resources are 
neutral ized in equi l ibr ium. 
Let  preferences  and  technology be as in G a m e  1. As in G a m e  1, the govern-  
men t  chooses a subsidy rate  13 at which it will subsidize pr ivate  contr ibut ions  
to public goods.  But in this game,  the gove rnmen t ' s  tax policy is different .  In  
Stage 1, the government  chooses a " h e a d - t a x "  "c i to be assessed against  each 
i and a subsidy rate 13 which will be pa id  on pr ivate  contr ibut ions  to public 
goods.  Thus  a consumer  who  contr ibutes  gi units o f  publ ic  goods  will receive 
a subsidy o f  ~gi and will have a net tax obl igat ion o f  zi - ~gi" The  government  
uses its net revenue,  which is Y.i(-~i-~gi), to supply addi t ional  units o f  the pub-  
lic good.  
In Stage 2 o f  the game,  the consumer ' s  budget  equat ion  is c i + gi = mi - 
"~i + [~gi or  equivalently,  
C i + (1--[~)g i = m i -- .ci. (3) 
The  supply  o f  public goods  is the sum o f  individual  contr ibut ions  plus the 
g o v e r n m e n t ' s  contr ibut ion.  This gives us g = gi + g - i  + Ejzj - ~Ejgj. This 
equa t ion  can be rewrit ten as (1-[~)gi = g - Y~i'ci - (1-[3)g_i .  Substi tut ing this 
expression into the budget  constra int  in Equa t ion  3, we can write the budget  
equa t ion  in " s t a n d a r d  f o r m " ,  m u c h  as we did for  G a m e  1 in Equa t ion  2. This 
budget  is 
C i -{- g ---- m i + ~] ((1-13)gj-zj) .  (4) 
j~ i  
For  G a m e  2, as for  G a m e  1, Nash  equi l ibr ium exists and is unique under  quite 
weak assumpt ions .  The  fol lowing is p roved  in the Appendix .  
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Theorem 3. (Existence and Uniqueness.) If preferences are continuous and 
strictly convex and if public goods and private goods are normal goods, then 
for any subsidy rate 13 such that 0 <_ ~ < 1 and head taxes ~l . . . . .  Xn, such that 
x i < m i for all i, there exists exactly one Nash equilibrium gl . . . . .  gn "5 
For this game it turns out that sufficiently "smal l"  change in the subsidy rate 
13 and the head taxes xi will be neutralized by offsetting private actions. This 
happens because each individual is able to adjust his private contributions to 
the tax-subsidy schedule in such a way that no matter what the other players 
do, his own private consumption will be the same as before the change. 
Let c* and g* be consumer i's equilibrium levels of  private consumption and 
public contribution if taxes and subsidies are both zero. Then c* + g* = m i 
and (c*,g*) maximizes Ui(ci,g ) subject to c i + g _< m i + g-i" From Equation 
4 it follows that with subsidy rate 13 and tax rate "q, consumer i can maintain 
a consumption of  c* by setting 
gi = ( g ~ - ~ i ) / ( 1 - ~ ) .  (5) 
If all consumers j ~ i maintain consumption levels cj* by choosing gj = 
(gj*-zi) /(1-~),  then Ej ~i( (1-~)gj-z j )  = g*--i, so that the budget equation (4) 
simplifies to c i + g = m i + g ' i -  This is precisely the budget equation faced 
by i when there are no taxes and subsidies. Therefore i will choose to maintain 
the initial public goods supply g*, by setting his own gift equal to gi = 
(g*-xi)/(1-13) and keeping c i = c*. Therefore, despite the taxes and subsidies, 
there is a Nash equilibrium in which private consumptions and public goods 
are the same as in the no-tax, no-subsidy equilibrium. We have proved the fol- 
lowing. 
Theorem 4. (Neutrality.) In Game 2, let g~ , . . . , g* ,  be the Nash equilibrium 
contributions if taxes and subsidies are zero. If the government introduces tax- 
es and subsidies such that x i ___ g* for all i, then in the new equilibrium with 
taxes and subsidies, each consumer will have the same private consumption as 
in the original equilibrium and the total amount of  public goods will also be 
unchanged. 
Given the uniqueness result of  Theorem 3, it follows from Theorem 4 that 
when taxes and subsidies can be offset by changes in private contributions, then 
the only Nash equilibrium is one in which the original consumptions are un- 
changed. 
From Theorem 4 and its proof  we can understand the exact limitations of  
the scope of  neutrality to small changes in taxes and subsidies. Equation 5 in- 
forms us that consumer i can maintain a constant consumption after the in- 
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troduction of  taxes and subsidies if and only if g* _> x i. This is the case if and 
only if the head tax that is introduced to pay for the subsidies does not exceed 
any consumer's initial voluntary contribution. 
The fact that neutrality fails for large changes in taxes and subsidies should 
not be regarded as a mere technical curiosity. To appreciate this point, notice 
that in a large economy, if a pure public good is supplied by voluntary contri- 
butions, the equilibrium supply of public goods will be far short of the Pareto 
optimal supply. The government could surely choose to collect taxes and to 
supply an amount of public goods that is close to Pareto efficient. Of course 
this would change the real allocation of resources, and so government's actions 
must not be neutralized. The neutrality that holds for small changes fails as 
soon as tax collections from some individuals come to exceed the amount of 
public goods that they would contribute voluntarily. 
4. G a m e  3 - Bernhe im's  game with neutral "dis tort ionary taxes" 
Bernheim (1986) presents a different model in which seemingly distortionary 
government policies are neutralized in equilibrium. According to Bernheim, if 
"individuals care about the magnitude of their own contributions only insofar 
as these contributions affect the aggregate level of expenditures; and all in- 
dividuals make positive contributions", then (among other things) "any  policy 
consisting of apparently 'distortionary' transfers and distortionary public 
finance of the privately provided public good, has no effect on resource allo- 
cations".  
In Bernheim's model, distortionary transfers take the form of taxes on labor 
income, which distort the labor-leisure choice. As Bernheim acknowledges, his 
result depends crucially on the way that decisions are timed. We will discuss 
a simplified variant of Bernheim's model which preserves the features essential 
to his argument, but in its simplicity is more transparent than the original. 
The economy has n consumers and three commodities - an ordinary con- 
sumption good, leisure, and a pure public good. Preferences of consumer i are 
represented by a utility function of the form Ui(g,ci,li), where g is the total 
amount of  public good provided, c i is i's consumption of the private good and 
1 i is i's leisure. 
Person i's income depends on how much leisure he chooses, according to a 
function mi(li). From consumer i, the government collects an amount of taxes 
which depends on the leisure choices, 1 = (11,... ,In), according to a function, 
ti(1). Each unit of public goods costs one unit of private goods and the govern- 
ment spends all of its tax revenue on the public good. Therefore, the amount 
of public good provided by the government is go = E~ ti(1 ). Individuals may 
also make voluntary contributions towards the supply of public good, where 
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gi is the contribution of consumer i. Total supply of  public goods is then g = 
~ gi" Let g_i = g - gi denote total contributions by the government and by 
consumers other than i. 
Following Bernheim, we model the economy as a game with four stages. In 
the first stage, the government chooses tax functions, ti(1 ). In the second stage, 
consumers choose their amounts of  leisure. In the third stage, consumers 
choose their voluntary contributions to the supply of  public goods. In the 
fourth stage the government collects the voluntary contributions and taxes ac- 
cording to the functions ti, and supplies an amount  of  public goods equal to 
its total revenue. 
Since the vector 1 of leisure choices is determined in Stage 2, it must be that 
when Stage 3 begins, each consumer's tax bill, after-tax income, and leisure is 
already set. Therefore, in Stage 3 the only choice left to a consumer is the divi- 
sion of his after-tax income between private consumption and contributions to 
the public good. This means that Stage 3 of this game is equivalent to Stage 
2 of the game studied in the first section of this paper where the subsidy rate 
[~ is zero and where m i = mi(li) - ti(1), for each i. Therefore Theorems 1 and 
2 establish existence and uniqueness of Stage 3 equilibrium conditional on the 
outcome, 1, of  Stage 2. 
Bernheim shows that, subject to certain qualifications, if the government im- 
poses a non-neutral tax on labor income and uses it to finance government sup- 
ply of public goods, then in equilibrium, the government's activities will be un- 
done by offsetting changes in consumer actions. Stated informally the 
reasoning is this. Suppose that after the government introduces a tax, every 
consumer decides to take exactly as much leisure as he did when there was no 
tax and also decides to reduce his voluntary contribution by the amount  of the 
tax. Then each consumer will be consuming the same amount  of  private goods 
as he was before the tax was imposed. The amount of public goods supplied 
is the sum of  private contributions and tax revenue, so it too will be unchanged. 
If all other consumers choose not to change their leisure and to reduce their 
donations by the amount of  the tax, then consumer i's budget constraint allows 
him to pursue the same strategy. Furthermore, the set of combinations of  pri- 
vate consumption and public goods supply that are possible for him is con- 
tained in the combinations available to him when there is no tax. Therefore his 
best choice will be the same combination of private consumption and public 
goods supply that he chose when there were no taxes. 
More formally, we have the following, which is proved in the Appendix. 
Theorem 5. In Game 3, consider a Nash equilibrium in which the government 
collects no taxes and pays no subsidies, and let 1" = 1~,. . .  ,1" and g* . . . . .  g*, 
be the equilibrium vectors of work efforts and donations to the public good. 
If the government introduces taxes according to a schedule ti(1), such that ti(l* ) 
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< g* for all i, then there exists a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for Game 
3, in which each consumer enjoys the same work effort,  the same consumption, 
and the same amount  of  public goods as in the no-tax equilibrium. 
Theorem 5 would not be true without the assumption that ti(l* ) _< g* for all 
i. This requirement means that the neutrality result only applies to the introduc- 
tion of  taxes in such a way that nobody is assessed a tax greater than the amount  
of  money he had been contributing voluntarily to the supply of  public goods. 
5. So what is the answer? 
In Game 1, the government is able to change the real allocation of  resources 
in a predictable way. In Games 2 and 3, seemingly distortionary government 
policies have no real effect on equilibrium. What, then, should we conclude 
about whether government policies are neutral? 
In all three of  the games that we modeled, if the government imposes a small 
lump sum tax on a contributor and spends the proceeds on the public good, 
there will be no real effect. When the government takes money from a person's 
pocket and gives it to the public good, she is not " fo o l ed " .  She will simply 
reduce her voluntary contributions by the amount  of  the lump sum tax. If peo- 
ple are prescient enough to see through the government veil of  lump sum taxes, 
then we might wonder why shouldn't  they also be able to see that distortionary 
taxes are also a veil? After all, the government policy does not create any new 
wealth. If  people can obtain their initial no-tax demands by offsetting changes 
in their contributions, won' t  they try to do so, even with a distortionary tax? 
The prediction of  a neutral subsidy has some appeal to our economist 's sense 
that rational agents who are able to see through the veil of  government policy, 
will also be able to discard this veil. 
Our first response to this question is to observe that even in those models 
where neutrality is found, the scope of  neutrality is very limited. Individuals 
are able to unravel the effect of a change in their tax burden only if the tax as- 
sessed against them does not exceed the amount that they would contribute 
voluntary to the public good in the absence of  taxes. The neutrality results in 
our Games 2 and 3, like those found by Warr, Andreoni,  and Bernheim all fail 
if any individual is taxed in excess of  the amount  he would contribute 
voluntary. 
What remains to be understood is the difference that leads to local neutrality 
in Games 2 and 3, but not in Game 1. We will examine the difference between 
Games 1 and 2. Similar contributions apply to the comparison of Games 1 and 
3. In Game 1 the government commits to making no direct contributions of  
public goods. 6 The government is assumed to balance the budget by adjusting 
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taxes on individuals. By contrast, in Game 2 the government commits to no 
change in taxes, and balances the budget by adjusting its contribution to the 
public good. In Game 2, each consumer has access to a strategy that will keep 
his private consumption constant after small changes in government policy, no 
matter  what  the other consumers do. Where g* is a consumer 's  contribution 
in the initial equilibrium, he can maintain the same consumption with tax rate 
xi and subsidy rate 13, by setting gi = (g*-'ci)/(1 -[~)" As it happens, if all other 
consumers choose to neutralize the effects of  the government policy on their 
own consumption,  then it will be optimal for every consumer to do so. 
In Game 1, if a consumer is to maintain his initial consumption as s i and [3 
change, then he must set his contributions at gi = (g*-si[~g-i) /(1-[~(1-si)) ,  
where g* is i 's no-tax equilibrium contribution. In contrast to Game 2, in ord- 
er to neutralize the effects of  the tax-subsidy scheme on his own consumption,  
each consumer must know the total contributions g - i  of  others. Moreover,  if 
each consumer believes the contributions of  others to be invariant to his own 
contribution, then he will not choose the same net contribution as he would 
with no subsidy or taxes. It  is possible to devise an extended version of Game 
1 in such a way that an equilibrium exists in which a government tax-subsidy 
plan would be neutralized. But to do this, individuals have to be offered a 
richer strategy space than simply choosing an amount  of  contributions. The 
idea is to allow each individual to announce that his own contribution will be 
a function of  the total contributions of  others and to compute equilibrium as 
a fixed point of  these functions. Specifically, suppose that  every consumer j 
i announced that his own contributions would depend on the contributions of  
others according to the function gj = (g~-sjl~g_j)/(1-[~(1-sj)) .  Then every 
consumer other than i would maintain the same private consumption with the 
tax-subsidy scheme as without it. Furthermore,  the best thing for consumer i 
to do would also be to maintain his original consumption,  which he would ac- 
complish by setting gi = (g*-sil3g-i)/(1-13(1-si)) .  
So we see that  even with the tax-subsidy policy outlined in Game 1, neutrality 
is possible if the game has an announcement stage and if individual strategies 
are expanded to allow individuals to make their contributions functions of  the 
contributions of  others. Does this restore the case for neutrality? We think not, 
for two reasons. One is a simple technical fact. In the game in which individual 
strategies are allowed to include functions, the neutral equilibrium is not the 
only Nash equilibrium. Another  equilibrium for this same game is an equilibri- 
um in which each individual submits a "cons t an t "  function, in which his con- 
tribution does not depend on the contributions of  others, but only on the tax 
rate and the subsidy rate. The equilibrium that we originally calculated for 
Game 1 is also a Nash equilibrium for this game. These equilibria, as we have 
demonstrated in Theorem 2 are certain to be non-neutral with respect to the 
subsidy rate. 
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A second reason is that the government 's intention in setting up a subsidy 
game is to influence the total amount  of  contributions. It would therefore try 
to set up the institutions of  that game in such a way as to avoid an "announce-  
ment round"  in which individuals could respond to each others' contributions. 
If  public goods decisions are appropriately modeled as a one-shot game, for 
which the government can set up the rules, then there seems little doubt that 
it could set up the rules and information structure to approximate Game 1 and 
it would expect that subsidies unambiguously induce increased total contribu- 
tions. But given that the game is played repeatedly, over the years, there may 
be room for lingering doubts that the insights gained from a one-shot model 
are the appropriate ones. 
Repeated play of  this game could be modeled as a "consistent conjectural 
variations equilibrium ''7 where consumers anticipate that eventually small 
changes in their contributions will be neutralized by offsetting actions of other 
consumers and accordingly choose to maintain constant consumptions in 
equilibrium, even with the tax scheme in Game 1. But in such a model, there 
will typically be many other subgame perfect Nash equilibria as well, including 
the one-shot Nash equilibrium we found for Game 1.8 As far as we know, no 
one has offered a model of  repeated games in which neutralization of distor- 
t ionary taxes stands out as a focal equilibrium among the many possible 
equilibria. 
We have shown that if a government tax-subsidy scheme (whether lump-sum 
or not) collects more taxes from some individuals than they would have con- 
tributed voluntarily, then the scheme will change the real allocation of  resour- 
ces. Moreover, we demonstrated a simple tax-subsidy scheme that would neces- 
sarily increase the level of  public goods even if nobody's  taxes exceed her initial 
voluntary contributions. Although it is true that tax-subsidy schemes can be 
designed which will be neutralized if they collect no more from any individual 
than she would contribute voluntary, it is also the case that a government that 
wants to increase the total amount  of  public goods can find a scheme to do so. 
This paper has several implications for future research on public goods. 
Contrary to suggestion in Bernheim (1986), we show that distortionary taxes 
can easily increase the private provision of  public goods. This means that 
researchers do not necessarily need to turn to alternatives to the simple public 
goods game in order to understand the effectiveness of  subsidies. In addition, 
if a researcher is interested in a game with neutral subsidies, such a model is 
most generally presented if it includes an announcement stage in which people 
can reveal their strategies. Since, as we argue, environments which generate 
non-neutral subsidies are more natural, the burden will then be on these 
researchers to defend the approach that generates the neutrality result. 
306 
Notes 
1. For the purposes of this model, the Nash outcome would be the same if stage 3 were collapsed 
into stage 2, with the government and the consumers playing simultaneously. But it may be 
easier to think of there being a third stage. 
2. Implicit in this construction is the assumption that both functions are well-defined and single- 
valued. This amounts to assuming that preferences are continuous and strictly convex. 
3. The lemma holds when both goods are private goods, as well as when one is public. 
4. Indifference curves are smooth at a point if there is no more than one tangent line at that point. 
This rules out kinked indifference curve. Without smoothness, a weaker version of Lemma 1 
would obtain, where the conclusion holds with weak (but not strict) inequalities. 
5. The equilibrium could possibly be one in which the government's contribution to the supply 
of public goods is negative. As a formal matter, the model still makes sense if we allow the 
government to run a deficit and "pay for" its subsidy by selling off private donations to the 
public good. 
6. More generally, the same results would follow if the government committed to a modest posi- 
tive contribution - so long as the amount it contributes is independent of any choices made 
by individuals. 
7. For discussions of consistent conjectural variations and related issues, see Laitner (1980), Bres- 
nahan (1980), and Marschak and Selten (1978). 
8. MacMillan (1979) showed that in a repeated game of voluntary contributions, the set of sub- 
game perfect equilibria is very large and contains Pareto optimal allocations. This plethora of 
equilibria is an instance of the well-known general problem in the theory of repeated games 
known as the Folk Theorem. 
9. The result that g' > g follows from g = (Eg_i)/(n-1) > (Eg~i)/(n-1) = g ' .  
10. This is just the feasibility constraint. To see that it is always holds in Nash equilibrium, one 
adds the budget equations over all individuals and makes appropriate simplifications. 
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A p p e n d i x  
As in the text of  the paper, let the demand functions Gi(p,y ) and Ci(p,y ) be the g and c respectively 
that  maximize Ui(g,ci) subject to c i + Pgi = Y. The first Lemma  is useful in proving Theorems 
1 and 3 on uniqueness of  equilibrium. 
Lemma A. For either Game 1, or Game 2, suppose that for a given subsidy rate 13 and tax 
parameters,  there are two Nash  equilibria gl . . . . .  gn and g~ . . . .  ,gn, such that  g '  = ~gi t _> g = 5~g i. 
Then  for all i, g~-i -> g - i .  
Proof of Lemma A. We first prove the L emma  for Game 1. We show that g'--i -> g - i  in each of  
the two possible cases where gi' > 0 and gi = 0. 
• Case (i). If gi' > 0, then since g~ . . . . .  gn is a Nash equilibrium, it must  be that  g '  = 
Gi(Pi,mi+(1-13)g~i). Since gl . . . . .  gn is a Nash equilibrium, it mus t  be that  g _> Gi(Pi,mi+ 
( l - I])g_i) .  By assumption,  g '  > g. Therefore Gi(Pi,m i + (1-13)g~i) _ Gi(Pi,m i + (1-~)g_i) .  Since 
the public good is assumed to be a normal  good, it follows that  m i + (1-~)g'_i  -> mi + ( 1 - ~ ) g - i  
and hence g '_ i -> g -  i- 
• Case (ii). Consumer  i has gi' = 0. Then  g - i  -< g -< g '  = gt-i so that g'--i -> g - i .  
The proof  of  Lemma  A for Game 2 uses the same argument  except that  this time we replace m i 
by m i - "c i at each point in the proof.  QED 
Proof of Theorem 1 
The existence of  at least one Nash equilibrium is a straightforward application o f  Brouwer 's  fixed 
point theorem to the funct ion mapping a vector is o f  contributions gl , .  - • ,gn into the vector of  
best responses. See, for example, Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986). 
Now let us consider uniqueness.  Suppose that  there are two distinct Nash equilibria correspond- 
ing to a given 13. Let gl . . . . .  gn, Cl . . . . .  c n, and g[ . . . .  ,gn, c[ . . . . .  Cn be the individual contributions 
and private consumptions  in the two equilibria. Suppose, without loss o f  generality that  g '  = Eg i' 
_> g = Eg i. Then according to L emma  A, it mus t  be that for all i, g ' i  -> g - i  and since the two 
equilibria are assumed to be distinct, it mus t  be that g'-i > g - i  for some i and therefore g '  > g.9 
Let Pi = 1 - [~(l-si). Since the private good is a normal  good and g ' i  >-- g - i ,  it must  be that  
c i' = Ci(Pi,m i + (1-13)g~i) _> Ci(Pi,m i + (1-13)g_i) = c i for all i with strict inequality for some i. 
Therefore,  ]~ic( > ~ici . But in equilibrium, it must  be that  ]~ici ' + g '  = ]~imi = Zic i + g.10 Since 
Zic i' > ]Eici, it mus t  be that  g '  < g. But this contradicts our assumpt ion that  g '  _> g. It follows 
that  there cannot be two distinct Nash equilibria. QED 
Proof of Theorem 3 
The proof  Theorem 3 is very similar to the proof  of  Theorem 1. The first two paragraphs of  that  
proof  carries over unchanged.  The third paragraph also applies with the following modifications. 
For all i, set Pi = (1-13) and wherever m i appears in the argument,  replace it by m i - t" i. QED 
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Proof  of  Theorem 5 
Let c~', 1" and g*, be the choices made by consumer i in the no-tax equilibrium. In Stage 3, con- 
sumer i chooses c* and g* to maximize Ui(ci,g* i + gi,l*) subject to the constraint c i + gi = mi(l*) 
and subject to g* ___ 0. This problem can be expressed equivalently as choosing g and c i so as to 
maximize Ui(ci,g,li) subject to c i + g = mi(l* ) + g*~i and subject to g ___ g*-i. 
Now let the government  collect taxes according to the schedule ti(1), f rom each i and spend its 
revenue on the public good. We claim that  there is an  equilibrium where each consumer reduces 
his voluntary contributions to exactly offset the new taxes. That  is, each consumer  reduces his con- 
tribution f rom g~'to g * -  ti(l*), which is non-negative by assumption.  If in Stage 2, consumers 
choose 1", then in Stage 3, consumer i 's  budget constraint will be c i + gi = mi(lO - ti(l*) and gi 
___ 0. The total amoun t  o f  public goods is the sum paid for out  of  taxes and individual contribu- 
tions. Therefore g = gi + ti(1) + Ej~i(gj+tj(l)). 
If  all consumers  other than  i contribute gj = gj~- tj(l*), then this last equation is equivalent to 
g = gi + ti(l*) + g*i .  Therefore the budget constraint becomes c i + g = mi(l* ) + g*--i and the 
constraint  that  gi -> 0 is equivalent to g -> g*--i + ti(l*)- But this budget  is the same as the budget 
constraint  in the absence of  the tax. Consumer  i can restore the no-tax equilibrium by choosing 
c i = c* and gi = g~' - ti(l*), in which case the total supply of  public goods is g* = E~ g*, just  
as in the no-tax equilibrium. Not only is this a possible choice for consumer  i, it is the best afforda- 
ble choice for consumer i given the actions of  the other consumers.  This follows from the principle 
of  revealed preference and f rom the fact that  the budget  set available to consumer  i with the taxes 
is contained in the budget  set available in the no-tax equilibrium. 
This reasoning shows that  for any vector I chosen in Stage 2, the same equilibrium will obtain 
with the tax as without the tax. Therefore the choices of  labor supply in Stage 2 will not  be altered 
by the tax. Given that the labor supply in Stage 2 does change, we have just  shown that  the choices 
in Stage 3 exactly offset  the tax and hence we have the promised neutrality. QED 
